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social norm s and the law. After one eats in a restau­
rant, that one has to leave a tip is a social norm, and that 
one lias to pay for the food is law. As is evident from this, 
both norms and the law influence our behaviour. What we 
say, for instance, can he curtailed by having laws that 
restrict freedom of speech. But not having such a restric­
tive law, or having a law or a constitutional requirement -  
such as the First Amendment in the US -  which gives 
individuals the right to say what they wish or believe in, 
does not automatically guarantee freedom of speech. Social 
restrictions can also curtail our freedom. If there is a social 
norm against a certain opinion or viewpoint or against the 
explicit mention of certain facts of life, then through the 
threat of ostracism and other ‘social’ punishments the indi­
vidual freedom to express a viewpoint or fact can be 
limited.
The goods that we buy, the food that we consume, the 
services that we render are all influenced both by the law 
and the norms of society. But in traditional economics 
there was little recognition of this fact, especially the influ­
ence of norms. In recent t ears this has been changing and 
there have been several initiatives to integrate the analysis 
of norms and institutions with markets and the provision 
of public goods (see, for instance, Ullmann-Margalit 1977; 
Ulster 1989). Indeed some of the clues to important eco­
nomic phenomena -  for instance, why one nation has rapid 
growth and another stagnates -  may lie in these extra- 
economic factors.
This essay begins bv discussing what social norms are 
and how they influence economic functioning. It com­
ments on the relation between norms and evolutionary 
processes and the interconnections between social norms, 
the law and the state and in particular the much-discussed 
question: to what extent can social norms or voluntary 
community-based effort be a substitute for law?
SOCIAL norms. Like cows, social norms are easier to 
recognize than to define. Most existing definitions are sug­
gestive rather than exact. Consider Axelrod’s definition 
(1986: 1097): ‘A norm exists in a given setting to the extent 
that individuals usually act in a certain way and are often 
punished when seen not to be acting in this way.’ This is a 
useful working definition but clearly it is understandable 
only by those who already know what a norm is. Likewise, 
Lister (1989: 99-100) defines ‘social norms by the feature 
that they are not outcome-orienlaP; and he adds that for 
‘norms to be social, they must be shared by other people 
and partly sustained by their approval and disapproval’. He 
then goes on to distinguish these from ‘legal norms’, which 
are ‘enforced by specialists who do so out of self-interest: 
they lose their job if they don’t. By contrast, social norms 
arc enforced by members ol the general community.' Jr is 
worth adding that at times social norms can get internal­
ized to the extent that they do not need social enforcement 
and are adhered to by individuals of their own accord. 
With these suggestive ideas in the background, it is conve­
nient to study norms by distinguishing between three
kinds ul’ social norms: rationality-limiting mums, prefor- 
cncc-changing norms .ind equilibrium-selection norms,
A ‘mimmility-timitiitg nnnn' menus ;i norm which stops 
us front doing certain tilings or choosing certain options, 
irrespective of how much utility that thing or option gives 
us. Thus most individuals would not consider picking 
■mother person's wallet in a crowded has. This they would 
do not by speculating about the amount the wallet is likely 
to contain, the chances of getting caught, the severity of 
tile law and so on, hut because they consider stealing 
wallets as something' that is simply nut thine.
In traditional economies the 'feasible set' of alternatives 
facing an individual (from which the person makes his oi­
lier choice) is delined ill terms uf technological nr bud­
getary feasibility. Titus a consumer's leasihle set is the 
collection of all the combinations of goods and services that 
the consumer can purchase given his or her income. From 
tile above discussion it should he- evident that a rationality - 
limiting norm further limits the feasible set, because now 
certain alternatives may be infeasible to an individual not 
just because they arc technologically infeasible (like 
walking on water) or budgctarily infeasible (like buying a 
Jaguar car) but because they are ruled out by the person's 
norms, Indeed a person endowed with norms may forego 
options which could have enhanced his utility and thus 
such a person would be considered irrational in terms of 
mainstream economies, Uasieally, such norms limiL the 
domain over which the rationality calculus is applied.
Some may arg'tte that instead of thinking that such 
norms- limit individual rationality, wo can simply redefine 
our utility function so that what I described above as 
normalivcly infeasible is described as ail option which 
gives a very low utility, perhaps negative infinity, lint 
doing this iiirnrinhly runs tile risk of reducing utility 
theory to a tautology. Moreover, in reality there are certain 
tilings we would love to do hut our norms gel in the way . 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that norms never change 
our preferences or utility functions. Certain norms do get 
internalized. There are many individuals whose rcligiun 
requires them to he vegetarian and they tell you that they 
find non-vegetarian food revolting anvvvay. More often 
than nor this is no coincidence; a religious norm adhered to 
over a stretch of time often gets internalized so that one 
begins actuallv Hi prefer what tile norm requires one to do. 
Ibis can explain why one finds systematic variations in 
taste across regions and nations. What starrs out as a norm 
or a custom can over time become pari of one's preference. 
Such a norm may he referred to as a 'preftmice-elwiigiiig 
imnn'. The only reason for being aware of this kind of a 
norm is that it can give us an understanding of how some 
o! our preferences are formed. This can enormously enrich 
the traditional model of economies, which treats prefer­
ences as primitives.
Finally, consider the norm, in many countries, of 
driv ing on tile right. It is true that this norm is additionally 
fortified by the law ; hut it is arguable that even if this were 
just a norm or a convention and not the law, people would 
still drive on tile right. This explains why the police have 
to he vigilant in enforcing tile stop-sign rule or the speed­
ing rule hut not the drivc-on-tlic-right rule. The first two 
are laws which are not in people's self-interest (they may of
course be in their I’nuip interest). Hut the third is a norm 
which, once it is in place, happens to he entirely compati­
ble with self-interested behaviour. In the absence of such a 
norm, there are at least two possible equilibria -  everyone 
drives on the left and everyone drives on the right. The 
norm is very different from the two discussed above 
because it simply helps people se/eel an equilibrium. It is 
lor this reason that I call such a norm an 'iU/itil/bnnin-se/er- 
tinii winn'. This is the norm the study of which is eurrentlv 
in vogue in economies and has generated a lot of literature, 
to the extent that economists lend to forget about tile other 
kinds of norms -  conveniently so, since tile equilibrium- 
selection norm is the one which is most compatible with 
conventional economics.
According to this terminology , Akerlof’s (1979) concep­
tion of caste is that of an equilibrium-selection norm. More 
recently. Cooler (11>07), in discussing the connection 
between norms and law, identifies norms entirely with 
equilibrium-selection norms. He describes a 'social norm’ 
as an ‘effective consensus obligation' and goes on to iden­
tify a consensus obligation with an equilibrium of a game. 
All these are special cases of the general idea of a social 
institution as an equilibrium of a game (Schnitcr I MSI; 
Calvert IW ).
Some writers have distinguished between 'conventions’ 
and (equilibrium-selection) norms, by treating the latter as 
special conventions, the adherence to which are addition­
ally fortified by the human desire (or peer approval 
(Sugdcn 1989; see also W’arncryd 1090). Thus Sugden 
(1989) has described the norm which used m exist in a 
fishing village in Yorkshire, whereby the first person arriv­
ing on the shore after a high tide had the right to collect 
the driftwood. Moreover, if she placed two stones on top of 
the pile, she could leave the pile- and take it at leisure. 
Sugden explains how such a rule can emerge initially as a 
convention which is tin equilibrium, in rite sense that once 
it is there, it is no one’s interest to deviate from it unilater­
ally. Then, over time, as people get used to it, they develop 
a sense of rights associated with litis convention; so that 
anybody violating it is met with social disapproval. That is 
how the convention becomes a social norm. While recog­
nizing the scope lor this kind of categorization, 1 shall 
nevertheless proceed by using the terms 'convention', 
'custom’ and 'norm' interchangeably.
The simplest example of such an equilibrium-selection 
norm may he illustrated with the prisoner’s dilemma. If the 
game is play ed (nice, no rational player will cooperate, as is 
well known. Hut suppose the game is heing play ed by two 
players repeatedly and without end. Then it is possible for 
the two players to adopt strategies such as the tit-lbr-tat 
strategy or the nigger strategy, which result in cooperation 
and which are in each player’s self-interest. A tit-for-iat 
strategy is one where the player begins by cooperating and 
then does what the- other player has done in the previous 
game. Evidently, if each of the two players play lit-lor-tat, 
they will end up cooperating throughout. If one of them 
deviates in one period by playing noncoopcralivcly, then 
(given that they are playing til-for-tat strategies) from then 
on i he > will both play the noneooperative strategy . lienee, 
unless the discount rates' of the players are so low that the 
future losses forever do not offset the one-time gain from
sudden defection, mi player will deviate, l ienee, lhe riL-liir- 
t.it strategy can lie thought of as ,i social norm which, once in 
place, survives because of self-interest (given that tile lime 
discount- rale is beloxv some criticil level). So, lar from being 
contrary to one's self-interest, these kinds of norms are para­
sitical on self-interest, lienee, thev sir rather comfortably 
with conventional economics and its hmiw iieeniniiuiius.
The distinctions discussed above may not always he self- 
evident. Outsider the norm of reciprocity, whereby human 
Iwings exchange favours oxer time, fo r instance, a person 
in need can expect help from other members of the tribe or 
the village, the implicit understanding being that the help 
xxill he reciprocated at other times illicit fortunes arc- 
rex ersed, 'I'liis norm can lie thought of as a rationality-lim­
iting norm since the person who helps out the destitute 
seems to do so against his yi7/-imerest. Hut xvc can also take 
a long-run pcrspcclixc on this and argue that if an individ­
ual refuses to help when it is lii.s turn, the whole system can 
collapse. So. in a manner akin to the case of cooperation in 
the repeated prisoner’s dilemma, the norm of reciprocity 
may be an equilibrium-selection norm, in other words, it 
vvill be foolish not to recognize that there may be compet­
ing explanations for the same norm.
MUMS, 111!, law .a\ t> nth sr.vt'K. At one level there is a 
lot in common between social norms and tile law, Hotb 
place- restrictions on individual behaviour. Uorh tend to 
work through sanctions, It is not surprising that there has 
been a large literature that compares and contrasts these 
txxo related forms of control over the individual (Hart 
l% l; Raz m il).
To understand the role of laxv in economics it is helpful 
to think of an economy as a large ‘game-’. That is, every 
citizen in the economy can he thought of as a ‘player' who 
lias available to him or Iter a set of actions (also called 
strategies), The final outcome that occurs in the economy 
depends on tile choice of strategy by each player, and each 
player's ‘pavolF or utility depends on everybody's choice 
of strategy . It is tile latter, which allows one person’s strat­
egy to affect another person's utility, that gixes tile 
game-theoretic approach its distinctness. It recognizes that 
externalities may be ubiquitous rather than the exception. 
An cconomv described as above may be called an ‘economy 
game'.
What role does law play in such a gamer Tile traditional 
\iew is that tile law either limits an individual's set of avail­
able strategies or changes the payoff function. Outsider 
two laws; (a) one that bans cigarette smoking and (li) one 
dial declares that anyhodv driving at a speed above HHIkm 
per hour has to pay a line of 200 francs. Now, (a) can he 
ibotiglii of as a law that limits the sei of strategics or 
actions open to an individual and (b) can be thought of as a 
laxv (hat changes the payoff function of individuals, l.arlicr, 
the payoff from driving at 140km per hour would he the 
sum of the joy of arriving early at die destination and the 
thrill of speed. Hut now (that is, once laxv (h) is in place), 
we have to subtract from that the expected cost of the line 
(that is, 200 Irancs multiplied by the probability of getting 
caught) to compute ihc- payoff of driving al 140kmpli. So, 
it does seem that the law can affeet the feasible set and the 
pay off function.
Note hoxvcvcr that it is also possible to think of the ban 
on smoking not as a rest rietion on the set of what a person 
can do hut as a change in the payoff function, because we 
can sax that even after tile- smoking ban a person am 
smoke. Inti has to pax a huge penalty if he is caught. Haird, 
Germer arid Ricker (1794) lake exactly this xiew. They 
think of laws as inxariahly affecting only the payoff func­
tions of players. This is a plausible alternative 
characterization.
More controversially, it is possible to go a step further 
and argue that strictly a laxv cannot affect either Lite strat­
egy sets or the payoff functions. We Iiaxe the impression 
that the laxv changes the payoff function because, unwit­
tingly, we treat tile enforcers of the law as agents 
exogenous to the economy game. We assume that they 
mechanically enforce what the law lays doxvn. Once the 
state is cndogciiiz.cd, howex'er, and tile enforcers of the law- 
are also treated us players with their own motivations, it 
becomes evident that the laxx cannot change the payoff 
functions or the strategx sets. This is because all players 
taken together are free to ignore die laxx and do exactly 
xxliat they were doing in the absence of the law , and in so 
iloing get the same payoff as hclui'c. .So, according to this 
argument, the law cannot change the game. It can only 
influence the nuhoine of the economy game and it does so 
by influencing the heliefs of players concerning how oilier 
players will behave, and by creating focal points (Hasu 
1997).
Much of the above description of the role of law in 
economics can be translated to social norms as well. The 
way in which norms differ from the laxv is in terms of their 
origins and enforcement, According to one classic view, 
linuuI Iv associated xvith Austin (INhl), a law is a command 
from tile sovereign to his subjects. In Austin’s model die 
sox ereign is ‘illimitable’ -  he can legislate any law into exis­
tence and in the exercise of his legal powers lie is mu 
liimsel flint tied by tile law, While Austin derived many of 
his views from Hcnthani, Hcntliani did not consider the 
sovereign to lie illimitable.
This view of the law as .something' that can only come 
from the stale or tile sovereign and is enforced by the 
agents of die stale- can, howexer, lie taken too far, as w hen 
some commentators do not regard ‘primitive laxx-’ as law at 
all. On the other hand, anthropologists- and historians have 
contested such an interpretation. Gluckman’s (1955) 
classic work outlines the legal sy stem ol the l.oz.i people of 
Harotseland and though it is not formally the laxv of the 
state it is x erx much a legal system, Similarly ancient laws, 
such us the Code of 1 laiimiurahi in .Mesopotamia which 
dates hack to more than two thousand years lit.o r the laws 
outlined by Kautilya for die Maurya Dynasty in India in 
the hook The . Irlhasliai-lni, written some time lietivccn the 
fourth ccmurv tic and 150 \i), are by any standard legal 
systems. They are codilied, have procedures fur implemen­
tation and are enforced by well-defined agents.
It is true that some norms shade into laws and the 
boundary between the two is not always sharp, A good 
example is caste or race discrimination. Are these matters 
of law or norms: In contemporary India, for instance, caste 
is clearly a matter of norms, since the law docs not recog­
nize caste differences (excepting for some kinds of
affirmative action to reverse historical disadvantages), But 
il"one goes hack in lime a Ihciusancl or two thousand year;;, 
the status of caste becomes ambiguous. If we recognize 
Kautilva's 1'hc Art ha sinistra as specifying the laws of that 
society, then caste, we have to admit, was a mailer of law. 
As family a states in no uncertain terms (1992: 4N4): ‘A 
Svnfiukn (a dog-breeder and an outeastc) man having 
sexual relations with an Aryu woman shall be condemned 
to death. A Shtpaka woman having relations with an Aryu 
male shall be. mutilated by having her cars and nose cut 
off.' (I leave it to the reader to decide which of these was 
considered the bigger crime.) Util if one goes even further 
back in time the caste system is simply an informal social 
system or norm, not enforced by the 'state' as law. 1,easing 
such troublesome cases aside, wc can, in general, assert 
that norms are either enforced by the community or 
society at large or by the individual's own sense of shame 
and embarrassment, whereas the law is enforced by the 
state or some organization resembling tile state,
Secondly, the origins of norms and laws are usually dif­
ferent. Laws ty pically can he enacted; and so dates ran be 
associated with particular laws. There are no doubt laws 
which do not take the form of legislative statutes. This is 
true, for instance, of Lbiglisli common law, and of the U.S 
practice of relying on interpretive principles and judicial 
rulings. As l''ercjohn notes (1995: 19.>), ‘Many nunslatu- 
lory legal materials [. . .| bear a formulaic resemblance to 
statutory commands, while having a different pedigree.’ 
Nevertheless, laws can he adopted through acts of parlia­
ment, even if (at times) only to codifv what is already 
accepted by custom. Social norms, on the other hand, 
almost always emerge gradually. Repealed patterns of 
behaviour gradually ossify into custom and then into a 
social norm, the violation nl which causes ey ebrows to be 
raised and is .seen as an aberration. The origins of many 
norms, such as caste norms, disappear into the mists of 
distant Instore.
As with all distinctions, this is not one without its prob­
lems. Legal theorists talk of ‘natural laws’ and ‘positive 
laws’ (for discussion, see Goldsmith 1996), The former 
consist of that which stems from our natural sense of 
morals and just ice, w hereas the latter refers to the eodilied 
laws of the slate or some comparable organization, hirst of 
all, to the extent that 'natural laws' arc also laws, their mots 
may be as difficult to locate as the roots of norms. More­
over, even for many positive laws, the origins often lie in 
the gradually hardening norms of tile society. Thus the law 
can at limes be simply a codification of norms. Not surpris­
ingly, legal scholars anil philosophers have differed on 
whether laws, especially natural laws, are invented or dis­
covered (Olalson 1%1).
This eon diet recently arose in the case of Miriam 
Wilngal, an eighteen-year-old woman in Papua New 
Guinea, whose elan agreed to give her away to another elan 
as part of a traditional tribal contract. The trouble arose 
because .Miriam refused to go, taking the case to court and 
citing the 'written law' of the state. The court ruled in her 
favour, lint the clan that has failed to secure Miriam has 
threatened to press counter-charges for the violation of 
contract and the denial of traditional tribal rights. As the 
Arm ) nrL limes (<i May Il4*J7) noted: ‘In effect, they arc
threatening to use the modern legal system to demand 
their traditional tribal rights.'
The origins of many norms are more difficult to under­
stand than their persistence (Basu, Jones and Scblicht 
19,57). As Akcrlof (1976) had argued, a norm persists if it is 
no one’s individual interest to violate it. I lencc, as in the 
prisoner’s dilemma game, norms can survive as long as 
they are individually rational, even though they mav harm 
the group as a whole. On other occasions some norms may 
be in the interest of one group and hurt another. These, at 
first sight, seem to amount to a rejection o f’functionalism’, 
which claims that institutions ovist to fulfil useful social 
functions, However, one can bring back a minimal func­
tionalism by recognizing that norms must have some 
properties of evolutionary stability.
hvoi.OTION ,\Nl> NORMS. Where these norms come from is 
dilfieult to explain but we can, at least partially, understand 
why some norms evist and why some do not, in terms of 
crnlntnimiry stability. Indeed evolution and norms are 
topics that have for long been discussed as closely related 
to each other (liavck I960; Axelrod 19,56; lioyd and Ricit- 
erson 1994). According to this argument, we do not see any 
society with the norm that one must not cat proteins 
simply because such a society would perish along with its 
norm. Similarly we do not find any society where stealing 
anything front anyone is considered legitimate because 
such a society would soon be in complete chans, become 
impoverished, and wither avvav.
On L’orcst Home Drive in the city of Ithaca, New York, 
there is a bridge on which two ears cannot cross at the 
same time. When we were children we were told Itovv in 
the Andes there are pathvvavs along steep mountains, 
which are so narrow that two persons cannot pass; and so 
when two persons found themselves face to lace on one of 
these paths, the one with the quicker draw survived In 
shooting the other person. In Ithaca n different norm is 
used. Cars pass in little convoys, three or four at a time, 
and the convoys from the two directions alternate. That is, 
after the third or the fourth car ahead goes, one just stops 
and waits for an oncoming convoy and then starts once 
again. This is against one's self-interest; so it rs indeed a 
rationality-limiting norm. However, the reason why we 
find some norm of this kind and not the Andean custom of 
a sltootHiut is that it is cvululionarily more stable. This is 
also the reason why the ‘Andes custom’ probably exists 
nowhere outside children's talcs. A society practising this 
norm would not survive and so neither would the norm. In 
brief, the evolutionary argument explains why certain 
norms cannot exist by demonstrating why societies which 
carry such norms cannot surv ive.
There are different ways of formalizing this intuition. 
Let me here follow the route of evolutionary game tlicorv 
a In Maynard Smith and Price (]97.i). In their model 
agents play a certain game [vairvvi.se, but unlike in the econ­
omist’s game in their 'game' (a) each agent plays a fixed 
strategy, and (b) the [layoffs do not really indicate uliiitv 
bill are fitness indices, whereby a higher [layoff implies a 
faster reproduction of the agent playing that strategy. 
Assumption (a) is justified by the fact that in these ‘games' 
the players are typically animals or phenotypes who cannot
choose rationally hut arc programmed to behave in certain 
wavs. A hawk always plays the aggressive strategy, a dove 
the accommodating one. Now think of a society in which 
all players are identical, that is they play the same strategy. 
Into this society occasionally other strategics (that is, 
players using other kinds of strategies) enter as mutants. If 
the mutants earn a greater payoff when they play the 
incumbents they kill off the original population. Other­
wise, tile mutants gel killed off and vve say that the existing 
population is ‘immune’ against the particular mutant in 
question. If a particular strategy is immune against all pos­
sible mutants we say that that strategy is ‘evolulionarily 
stable’. That is, agents programmer! to play that strategy 
will survive the process of natural selection. From this to 
explain the evolutionary survival ol norms is a small step.
Consider what has been described above as a rationality- 
limiting norm. Hence a social norm is a restriction on what 
people choose. This is the view that lioyd and Richcrson 
(1994:72) take in their anthropological study of norms: \ \  
culture's norms determine which behaviours are permissi­
ble and w hich arc not.' Hence, if we .start with a game in 
which each person has a feasible set of strategies, then a 
‘norm’ is a subset of that set. For instance, Us norm may 
allow / to choose anything from that set, except the strate­
gies of picking pockets in buses and jumping queues.
I Jcticc, a person w ith a norm is between the textbook homo 
lYonoitiiais who is free ro choose any strategy and 
Mavnard-Smirh and Price's player who has to choose one 
specific strategy. Now instead of looking for si)arctics 
which are evolulionarily stable wc can look for norms which 
are evolulionarily stable (Basu 19%). Such an approach 
can y ield interesting insights. It can explain certain kinds 
of cooperative behaviour and altruism. Stable norms can 
earn payoffs greater than in a Nash equilibrium.
A related question that in recent times has exercised the 
minds of many researchers working in the area of law and 
social norms is this: can social order be achieved through 
social norms and community efforts, milhunt the interven­
tion of the state anti its laws, and without bringing in the 
effects of natural .selection and evolution.'
law and OR mat. M.egal centralism' is a phrase dial has 
been used In Williamson (!9<SJ) to express the belief that 
all law- and its enforcement come from the government. 
From such a belief it is easy to jump to the belief that the 
order that we sec in the world -  if) the extent that wc do -  
emanates from the law and its enforcement. This belief has 
in turn given rise to a large literature, both theoretical and 
empirical, which challenges this assumption (Taylor 1976; 
Sugden 1989; Flliekson 1991). W ith the rise of game 
theory the theoretical ideas are now easy to grasp. First, we 
can often shape the behaviour of another person by using 
the threat of ‘evil’ from a relationship. .Secondly, many 
games or .strategic environments in which some sulioptimal 
outcome seems inevitable turn out differently when 
repeated interactions are considered. As already noted, if 
the prisoner's dilemma is played repeatedly rhe players 
may be able rn cooperate without the need for third party 
intervention. The threat of future retaliation keeps the 
players in line. Unfortunately, and this is important to 
keep in mind, this method cannot explain cooperation in
the prisoner’s dilemma but only in a variant of it, namely 
when it is played an infinite number o! times.
Whether for these reasons or not, there are many exam­
ples of societies or groups ushering in order without 
recourse to the law. Bernstein (1992) has described in 
detail how the diamond industry organizes its own system 
of punishment and monitoring without seeking legal help. 
Flliekson (1991) documents how the ranchers of Shasta 
County, California, have evolved their own rules and sanc­
tions to bring order in their lives and professional pursuits. 
Interesting though these facts are one lias to be careful in 
posing these examples and arguments as part of the debate 
on state intervention and nonintervention. There is no 
reason why w'c must think of tile state as a force opposing 
private efforts. After all, the state itself emerged gradually, 
from the atomistic actions ol individuals. So in some ways 
the state is itself like a norm. Hence, the state may be 
viewed as one of the many different instruments through 
which individuals create order among themselves. Instead 
of thinking of the law and social norms as alternative 
systems, or worse, as adversaries, it is possible it) treat the 
legal system as part of’the general theory of norms.
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